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Military operations have all the trademarks of agile decision making due to the complexity, 
uncertainty, time constraints, high risk and ill-defined goals of the mission environment.  Any 
discussion of the naval command and control environment must address the relationship between 
the decision maker and the technological systems with which he operates.  The U.S. Navy tends 
to address issues of decision superiority with improved technology, sometimes disregarding what 
the human operator brings to the picture.  We argue that this approach provides limited short-
term gains in terms of human performance.  Addressing the root cause of decision making 
problems by realigning professional training, selection, and experience with the prerequisite 
analytical, intuitive, creative, and affective skills is a superior approach.  A decision maker’s skill 
of striking a balance among these abilities, finding the right synthesis for the right situation, 
adapting to the situation, and moving along the continuum of performance, is what is needed to 
improve decision making in the maritime environment – not more C2 displays.  Through the 
synthesis and application of the fields of expertise development and decision making, a 
framework of command tactical performance or “artful competence” is presented that has direct 
implications for improving decision superiority.   
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Commander Jones stands behind his Officer of the Deck, preparing to make a decision that could 
change the success of his mission.  His fast attack nuclear submarine (SSN) is hidden at 
periscope depth off the coast in the Pacific operating area surrounded by merchant vessels and 
fishing trawlers.  His best sonar technicians are on the stacks listening, searching, and tracking 
contacts.  He is thankful that prior to deployment his boat was outfitted with the latest, advanced 
combat system, which his fire control team is using to develop target solutions.  After observing 
a foreign navy surface warfare exercise for several days, his boat gains a contact with an acoustic 
signature of a Kilo-class submarine, with a zero bearing rate.  He has dozens of displays to 
consult, from nearly raw acoustic date from the hostile contact, to plots showing tracks to current 
positions.  While he must consider his remaining mission priorities, he must also assess various 
new courses of action (such as changing his course, speed, and/or depth) in response to the 
hostile submarine contact given the constraints of his operating environment and rules of 
engagement.  
 
This hypothetical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) scenario provides a brief 
glimpse of the environment in which a naval commanding officer may find himself: It has all the 
trademarks of a complex decision making environment.  Note that the Commanding Officer 
(CO) may have all the information necessary to decide on a course of action, but he has no real 
decision aid.  The reason is that the “best” course of action depends on his orders (e.g., should he 
avoid foreign submarine contact, or attempt to track while avoiding counterdetection), and also 
on his assessment of the future behavior of the contact, and the current and future environmental 
conditions (e.g., will they support a favorable detection vs. counterdetection posture?).  All of 
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these considerations are completely cognitive – they are represented in the CO’s situational 
awareness, not in any technological system or display.   
 
In military terms, the goal of operational performance in this vignette would be “decision 
superiority.”  Decision superiority is the “ability of the commander, based upon information 
superiority and situational understanding, to make effective decisions more rapidly than the 
adversary, thereby allowing one to dramatically increase the pace, coherence, and effectiveness 
of operations” (U.S. Joint Forces Command Glossary, 2008).  This Joint definition is complete in 
that it accounts for both the command and control (C2) systems involved and the human 
warfighter’s decision making or cognitive ability.  Thus, decision superiority is at a higher level 
than information superiority because it is more than a technological capability – it is a human 
capability coupled with technology.   
 
Therefore, the concept of decision superiority is much more than merely information superiority 
with a new name.  Yet, military guidance still focuses on the information component of decision 
superiority.  For example, the Chief of Naval Operations’ guidance for 2008 included “ensure 
U.S. Navy forces achieve Decision Superiority (ISR, C4, and Information Operations)” (Chief of 
Naval Operations, 2007, p. 4).  In reality, this will require much more emphasis on the 
development of cognitive and intuitive skills for effective decision making to take advantage of 
hardware systems for C4ISR information display.    
 
In this paper we review the misconceptions of situational awareness, and how this has led to 
neglect of the human decision maker in the development and fielding of technological systems 
and doctrine.  While this is not a completely original idea, the goal is to bring the concept back 
into collective awareness so as to harness the advances in technology to their full capability.  We 
end with a proposal of the cognitive abilities required for a decision maker to excel in the 
dynamic military operational environment.  With an accurate characterization of the necessary 
capabilities that support warfighter decision superiority, coupled with a realistic conception of 
situational awareness, the armed forces will be better prepared to encounter the hybrid warfare 
environment of the future (Hybrid warfare reference). Although the current argument is 
presented in the context of undersea warfare operations and commanding officer decision 
making, similar applications relate across the range of military operational domains. 
 
IT’S MORE THAN A COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE: 
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS MISCONCEPTIONS 
 
In the introductory scenario CDR Jones finds himself at the crux of the state of the art C2 
systems and what he brings to the situation as the decision maker.  Military operational personnel 
often believe that the common operational picture (COP) presented on a C2 system is his 
situational awareness (SA).  Take for example, Vego’s (2009) statement “…strictly defined, 
situational awareness refers to the degree of accuracy with which one’s perception of the current 
environment mirrors reality.  Situational awareness does not necessarily mean an understanding; 
it is purely a tactical, not operations or strategic, term.  The extensive use of the term situational 
awareness in the U.S. and other militaries is perhaps one of the best proofs of the predominance 
of a narrow tactical perspective among information warfare advocates” (p. 44).  According to 
this (mis)characterization, SA is limited to the knowledge of friendly, enemy, and operational 
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environmental factors generated by both human and technical means derived from the COP.  A 
further example is provided by a discussion of the network centric warfare framework that 
“envisions dramatic improvements in the COP by 2010 and predict near perfect situational 
awareness/dominant battlespace awareness in the 2020 timeframe.” (Bindl, 2004, p. 5).    
  
This logic is flawed because both authors’ definitions of situational awareness are incomplete.  
SA extends beyond a tactical perspective, and the preferred definition is best captured by 
Endsley (1995): “the perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and 
space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future.”  
Although numerous definitions of SA have been proposed, Endsley’s depiction of SA in three 
levels is the most grounded in the human systems integration (HSI) and research community.  As 
viewed in this light, a COP only applies to the first level of SA – perception of the relevant 
elements in the operating environment.  This level of SA is most closely tied to the C2 systems 
that support information superiority.  The second and third levels of SA are where decision 
superiority is truly displayed by what the warfighter does with the information, how he 
comprehends the information, and makes predictions of future states, all influenced by doctrine, 
training, experience, and his capabilities.    
 
Even if the COP was the only necessary component to achieve SA, the assumption that a COP 
leads to a common understanding among everyone is incorrect.  Bindl (2004) notes that if two 
different people are given access to identical information they will use different filters to process 
and comprehend the information; thus their pictures will not be the same.  These filters could 
come from various sources such as a person’s experience, training, or general human biases and 
heuristics (Kahneman, Tversky, and Slovic, 1982). 
 
There is still disagreement about the processes used to achieve SA, and the best manner in which 
to measure SA, and there are further considerations when addressing the issue of team SA 
(Letsky, Warner, Fiore, & Smith, 2008).  Yet, there remains a disconnect between the concept of 
SA that is COP-based and that which emphasizes the warfighter.  Decision superiority must draw 
upon two necessary components, 1) the human decision maker, with all that he brings in terms of 
experience, training, doctrine, judgment, abilities, and 2) the technology that provides the 
information needed by the warfighter.  Decision making is an inherently human act, and C2 
technology is a tool to assist the decision maker.  Even if the information gathered, collated, and 
displayed on a system is flawless, the warfighter can still have poor SA and make suboptimal 
decisions.  The current argument is that the C2 community needs to fully integrate the human 
component in SA and decision superiority.    
 
WARFIGHTER AND TECHNOLOGY SYNTHESIS 
 
The mischaracterization of SA as an instantiation of a technological system via the COP 
translates to an overemphasis on technological solutions to decision superiority and performance 
issues.  The U.S. military, the Navy in particular, tends to address issues of human performance 
with newer or more technology, sometimes disregarding what the human operator brings to the 
picture.  Even when HSI best practices are implemented, the solution is still typically new or 
improved software or hardware.  The most important part of SA – the warfighter being able to 
project into the future what will happen based on those “soft” factors such as experience, 
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training, doctrine, and abilities – has been neglected by focusing on technology.  SA is not 
something a C2 system has because SA is a uniquely human capability.  
 
Like other armed services, the Navy has embraced technology in its modern day warfare to 
achieve decision superiority (Lautenschlager, 1983).  The success of many naval missions and 
operations depend uniquely on the success of the technological systems that are used; thus, the 
Navy’s solution to most performance problems is to focus on technology rather than the human 
decision maker.  A confounding factor to this one-sided emphasis is the fact that the 
organizations that are responsible for the development and fielding of new technology (e.g, the 
acquisition community) are to some extent disconnected from the organizations in charge of 
selecting and training the human operators1, and the organizations that determine who fills what 
job2.  Occasionally this lack of alignment and communication can result in a mismatch between 
the technology and the decision maker, resulting in suboptimal performance (e.g, decision 
making).  For example, the operation of a submarine, both surfaced and submerged, requires the 
accurate execution of many human and technological processes.  Despite advances in sensor 
accuracy, processing power, and digital displays that provide contact management capability and 
electronic Voyage Management System plotting, human performance and decision making errors 
are still made.  With such advanced technology, why are there still mishaps?  How can these 
systems and technological advances not support optimal decision making in navigation, contact 
management, and mariner skills?  Only by gaining fundamental understanding of expert tactical 
decision making processes and best practices in the nearly all digital Control Room team 
environments, can science and technology investments inform the development of integrated 
information displays that mitigate the effects of uncertainty, and provide alternatives to existing 
decision support tools, to achieve improved submarine CO and crew decision making.  To date 
technology has not solved the problems.  
 
While technological solutions can be quicker, more affordable in the short term, and less risky 
than solutions that focus on the decision maker, there are shortcomings of this approach.  Even 
when designed under the guise of HSI, technology-based solutions often address the symptom, 
but not the root cause, of performance or decision making problems.  It is often a reactionary, ad 
hoc approach that may provide immediate benefits, but in the long term the performance 
problems will reemerge.  Moreover, when new technology is introduced it follows the “stove 
pipe” approach without consideration of existing technology.  Thus an unintentional 
consequence becomes too much technology in the form of too many displays or information 
overload.  Or alternatively, “simplified” displays may hide complexity behind abstraction, and 
therefore require much more expertise for sensemaking.  Without devoting similar resources to 
the user side of the equation, these problems will continue to persist and the technological cycle 
will continue.  As one British submarine Commanding Officer notes, “decision-making involves 
judgment and no machine has yet to achieve this core skill to the level required to engage in the 
art of warfighting” (Ramsey, 2007, p. 10). 
 
The relationship between technology and humans has received considerable attention in the HSI 
field.  Specifically, Miller and Shattuck’s Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition (DMSC) 
                                                 
1 In the U.S. Navy, this is the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC).  
2 In the U.S. Navy, this is the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS). 
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describes the relationship between technology and humans in a system, and has been applied to 
several military domains (Miller & Shattuck, 2004):   
 
“The DMSC posits that there are various stages of technological and cognitive system 
performance.  On the technological side, all the data in the environment, data detected by 
technological systems (e.g., sensors), and data available on local command and control 
systems (C2; e.g., workstations) are included.  Each of these stages includes a subset of 
what was included in the preceding step.  Building upon this technology are the 
perceptual and cognitive systems offered by the human operator.  These include data 
perceived by the decision maker, comprehension of the decision maker and, finally, 
projection/prediction of the decision maker.  These cognitive stages equate to the three 
levels of SA promoted by Endsley (2000).  Embedded between these stages are lenses, 
which serve to focus or distort an individual’s cognitive processes.  Such lenses embody 
the context in which the situation occurs, and includes the individual’s unique 
experiences and cultural background, the local situation and, in military situations, may 
include the operational order, military doctrine, and rules of engagement.”(Miller, Shobe, 
& Shattuck, 2005, p. 1) 
 
The DMSC applies mostly to system design in that it accounts for real-time dynamic 
performance of individuals and teams as they interact with technology in a system.  The general 
premise that both the decision maker and technology need to be considered is extended in this 
paper to include the decision maker characteristics that are necessary for optimal decision 
making, and the importance of professional development that is appropriately designed to train 
decision makers in the complex environment.  In support, Ramsey (2007) – the British CO – 
further notes that improving command and control technology (C2) is not the correct approach 
for ensuring warfighting success.  C2 is limited in what it can provide, and decision making 




Decision making in many military operational environments involves many extremely difficult 
tasks. “Incredibly Complex Tasks” are tasks that are almost unbelievably complicated, in that 
they require years of highly contextualized study and experience (Wulfeck & Wetzel-Smith, 
2008).  Features that contribute to task complexity are uncertainty, ambiguity, variability, non-
linearity, interactivity, abstraction, and conditionality.  These tasks require deep expertise and 
highly focused practice for successful performance.  Successful decision making in this task 
environment requires “artful competence” – a skill that most people intuitively understand but 
are unable to define.  Artful competence is revealed in what a person does; demonstrating 
superior performance by handling complexity, instability, and conflict when engaging people 
and situations (Schon, 1983).  But what is “artful competence” really?  Can it be defined and 
measured?  Where does it come from?  Answers to these questions directly apply to professional 
development, performance, evaluation, and selection, and can be used to augment technology-
based solutions to decision superiority.   
 
A satisfactory framework of artful competence in military operations does not exist.  In the 
undersea warfare domain, recent emphasis has focused on intuitive decision making rather than 
on analytical reasoning (Casciano, et al., 2005) when both are actually required.  In fact, there is 
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a long history in the field of psychology concerned with this debate.  Informed by this, 
discussions of operational performance require a balanced approach between the intuitive and 
analytical workings of the mind.  Moreover, research on expert performance suggests that a 
multi-dimensional framework accounts better for this artful competence.  In particular, a 
person’s creative and affective abilities also contribute heavily to optimal performance, 
especially in novel, high risk situations.  A CO’s skill of striking the right balance among all 
these components is what sets apart the extraordinary captain from the average captain.  
Performance in situations characterized by uncertainty, disorder, and indeterminacy, as well as in 
dynamic situations that consist of complex systems of changing interdependent problems, 
demands a warfighter who masters the convergence of all these abilities.   
 
What is Artful Competence? 
 
Superior performance is supported by complex cognitive abilities, and requires a capacity for 
coordinating different abilities into an integrated mechanism.  Thus, artful competence stems 
from a person’s optimal synthesis of abilities for the appropriate situation.  Focusing solely on 
intuitive decision making ignores a large portion of what embodies a CO’s performance.  
Reframing the issue in terms of factors which allow a CO to excel by applying the right synthesis 
of skills at the right time provides greater benefit for assessment, selection, training, 
development, and operations. 
   
There are many ways of parsing human cognition and abilities, and the current schema borrows 
from various expertise frameworks in order to determine how a person’s unique profile of 
capabilities3 supports CO performance.  Different areas of expertise require different abilities for 
success, and therefore different levels of functional integration.   
 
Before discussing what these abilities are, the multi-dimensional and dynamic nature of artful 
competence should be emphasized.  While the abilities mediate superior CO performance, artful 
competence is best governed by a CO’s ability to organize (probably without awareness) the 
right integration of these abilities in a timely manner for the situation.  For example, the required 
skill configuration necessary for superior performance in a flooding casualty is different from 
that needed for weapon employment against a hostile contact, which in turn is different from a 
surface transit with restricted visibility.  Moreover, a CO’s ability to achieve success depends on 
his ability to capitalize on his strengths while compensating for his weaknesses.  The ability to 
recognize and reach the right equilibrium of creative, affective, analytical, and intuitive skills in 
different situations is the holy grail of CO performance.  While these are perhaps not exhaustive 
of all the competencies that contribute to CO performance, these four are highlighted because of 
their prominence in most critical operational scenarios. 
 
More important in terms of performance, however, is the symbiotic relationship among these 
abilities.  One skill can not be developed, trained, or performed independently of the others. 
These four abilities need to be developed in concert instead of the current “stovepipe” approach.  
In situations characterized by uncertainty, disorder, and indeterminacy, as well as in dynamic 
situations that consists of complex systems of changing interdependent problems, an officer 
                                                 
3 The terms ability, capacity, capability, and competency are used interchangeably in this paper.    
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needs to master the convergence of all these abilities and be able to optimally synthesize them 




A warfighter’s artful competence is demonstrated when he4 is able to recognize that standard 
methods will not work; that he needs to change his problem solving strategy when he is in a 
novel situation. This ability is referred to as creativity.  A discussion on hybrid warfare 
specifically points out the importance of this ability: “any force prepared to address hybrid 
threats would have to be built upon a solid professional military foundation, but it would also 
place a premium on the cognitive skills needed to recognize or quickly adapt to the unknown.” 
(Gompert, 2007). 
 
This proposal is not novel (Sternberg, 1999), but it is often neglected in discussions of 
operational performance.  Creative ability “entails the capacity to generate ideas that are 
simultaneously original and adaptive” (Simonton, 2003, p. 214). Creativity is specific to the area 
of expertise and is multi-dimensional in that it includes abilities, dispositions, and personality 
traits.  The current characterization likens it more to a metacognitive strategy that is necessary in 
order to cope with unique situations.  It is the manner in which the person interacts with a 
complex situation, characterized as a reflective conversation wherein the person detects and 
corrects errors in his own performance.   
 
Creative skill is needed for the effective use of specialized knowledge that is applied in 
restructuring of complex, uncertain situations, especially because expertise tends to reduce 
cognitive flexibility.  Creative ability allows a CO to maintain cognitive flexibility, adapt to the 
situation, and recognize when the balance between the analytical and intuitive needs to change.  
Thus, a person’s creative skill can be applied to both his analytical and intuitive cognition since 
it allows the person to determine where he needs to be along the cognitive continuum for the 
situation.  Creative ability prevents perseveration, or functional fixedness, when a new strategy is 
needed.  It is a person’s ability to flexibly and effectively adapt to or perform in the environment.   
This skill is especially important for experts because they have a well developed intuitive skill 
based on their level of experience, but as noted below, intuitive cognition is not optimal for 
unique situations.  If a CO relies too heavily on intuitive decision making, his performance may 
suffer (Erickson, Prietula, & Cokely, 2007).  The ability to reflect is needed to overcome this 
obstacle.  He approaches each problem as a unique case attending to the peculiarities of the 
situation.  This skill may be especially important in identifying “weak signals” by combining 




Any discussion of a CO’s artful competence must address the factors that a high risk operating 
environment brings to the situation.  Cognitive and creative skills need to be embedded within an 
affective capability, which refers to the ability to regulate emotion or arousal either consciously 
                                                 
4 Since this paper draws mostly from the all male submarine community, “he” is used to denote the gender of the 
CO. 
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or unconsciously.  A person could possess all the relevant knowledge necessary to perform in 
routine command and control situations, but seriously fail when the situation gets stressful and 
time critical – when a person “lost the bubble.”  Likewise, if a situation becomes overly 
celebratory, a person needs to maintain his ability to think clearly and flexibly.   
 
Emotional regulation is essential during stressful, high anxiety environments because emotion 
can both guide and inhibit action.  Effective regulation of emotion results in limiting extremes 
producing composure, resilience, calmness, and executive control.  A person who exhibits this 
capability appears objective, engaged but not compulsively attached, and in control of the 
situation.  This provides the person with the mental resources to cognitively reappraise the 
situation to determine what actions to take, and allows for more tolerance of ambiguity.  He is 
able to assess a troubling situation with calm reflection.  Research has demonstrated that there 
are individual differences in both the conscious and automatic ability to regulate emotion or 
arousal (Gross & Thompson, 2007).  Whatever the basis for the ability to regulate emotional 
arousal, it is clear that this component of a CO’s artful competence contributes to successful 




In discussions on performance, emphasis is usually given to analytical, deliberate, or rational 
cognitive abilities.  Indeed, in some situations a CO’s performance is supported by his ability to 
recall and recognize information, then analyze, evaluate, and judge the information before him.  
This ability supports problem solving and decision making, and is easiest in situations with little 
time pressure.  Of the four artful competence abilities, the analytical ability is most often studied 
by scientists and gains most of the attention in both military and public schoolhouses.  The 
successful application of this ability depends partly on meta-cognition, or an awareness of how 
to control these cognitive processes during the course of performance.  For example, recognizing 
the existence of a problem, defining its nature, deciding on a corrective course of action (COA), 




Intuitive cognition is also crucial for a person’s performance, which is the act of knowing 
something without the use of rational processes such as deduction or reasoning.  The idea that 
cognitive processing and decision making can occur outside of consciousness is not new, and has 
the advantage of a long history in psychology (Kihlstrom, 2002).  What is new is an appreciation 
by organizations traditionally focused on analytical problem solving for the importance of 
intuitive cognition.  The organizational application, however, tends to characterize cognitive 
abilities as either analytical or intuitive rather than as co-occurring processes.   
 
Intuitive cognition is multi-dimensional, and incorporates many different processes, such as 
perceptual/pattern recognition, pattern matching, framing, situation assessment, and schema 
instantiation.  These skills are learned through experience in a given field of expertise, and are 
rarely explicitly taught (although they should be).  Since it is experience-based, intuition is 
optimal in routine and familiar situations, but can lead to poor performance in unique situations.  
Intuition lags behind the development of analytical cognition in a given subject matter area.  For 
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example, a relatively new performer may have the knowledge to perform a procedure, but this 
knowledge will not become intuitive until he has an adequate amount of experience to develop 
the automatic associations.  Knowledge cannot become intuitive in an expert domain without 
sufficient experience and training.   
 
Even though this component is built from experience and can usually be applied automatically 
when needed, it is still amenable to analysis and deliberate practice – it can be explicitly 
developed.  Deliberate practice and thinking is needed to develop this skill for correct 
application; otherwise intuitive decision making can lead to incorrect solutions.  Deliberate 
practice occurs when a person pursues a well-defined task appropriate for his performance level 
while allowing for opportunities for errors, error correction, and informative feedback (Ericsson, 
Prietula, & Cokely, 2007).  The capacity for reflection on his intuition in the midst of action 
allows a CO to cope with unique, uncertain, and novel situations.   
 
Harnessing the advantage of intuitive cognition requires a dedicated effort to make sure the 
correct factors are included in that intuitive instantiation.  The application of intuitive decision 
making assumes it is based on accurate knowledge structures and processes appropriate for that 
situation.  Over time, an experienced, superior CO constructs retrieval structures indicated by 
long term memory capability.  Pattern matching is the prevailing intuitive cognitive skill that 
superior leaders demonstrate.  However, once a person has activated a pattern, there is a strong 
cognitive bias to assume it is the right one for the current situation (Feltovich, Spiro, & Coulson, 
1997).  This bias may lead to over focusing, or to force-fitting competing information to an 
inappropriate pattern.  The creative ability is then required for a CO to manage his intuition and 
be artfully competent in the variety of situations, including novel ones.    
 
While the creative, affective, analytical, and intuitive abilities mediate superior CO performance, 
artful competence really is displayed by the CO’s ability to find the right equilibrium of these 
abilities in a timely manner for the situation.  How well this integration is aligned with the 
situation’s requirement will determine success.  An explicit definition of the abilities that form 
the basis of superior CO performance helps determine the alignment of Navy selection, 
advancement, training, and evaluation with these abilities, and will ultimately result in optimal 
decision making in situations such as the introductory ISR scenario.    
 
WHERE DOES ARTFUL COMPETENCE COME FROM? 
 
Like most domains of expertise, training and experience are the two major contributors to the 
development of a CO’s artful competence.  However, the quality of training and experience is as, 
or more important, than the quantity (Clark, 2008).  The suggestion that these abilities are 
developed from training and experience implies that they are not traits in the traditional sense 
that they are fixed and rigid characteristics of an individual.  These abilities are modifiable, 
flexible, and dynamic.  In other words, they can change over time, especially if the training and 
exercises influence the extent to which they are applied and developed. 
Training 
In human systems integration (HSI), total system performance is optimized when training is 
aligned with the human abilities required for skillful performance.  Specifically, the mantra 
“train like you fight, fight like you train” requires awareness of what is required to fight – not 
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just now, but in future warfighting conditions.  Informed by the extensive literature on expert and 
naturalistic decision making, we propose that knowledge of the desired end goal, or the 
knowledge, skills, and abilities (e.g., creative, affective, analytical, and intuitive), for exceptional 
decision making in military operational environments can be used to better align professional 
development with optimal decision making.   
 
Current Navy training often excludes this foresight and provides training exclusively for the 
skills required for the present or subsequent job (e.g., just in time training).  However, 
knowledge about the desired end goal of a person’s professional development will optimize 
performance by laying the groundwork for skills that are currently necessary and others that will 
become more important in their future naval career.  We propose that the misalignment between 
current training paradigms and the skills required for decision making in the undersea 
environment is a root cause of current decision making errors; thus technology-based solutions to 
decision making problems will have a limited effect.    
 
For example, with this knowledge we can begin to better align submarine officer training with 
these abilities.  Other authors have noted this misalignment (Dobbs, 2007), while others have 
written about the characteristics of what makes a good CO (Casciano, et al., 2005).  There is a 
paradox between the skills trained and required by a submarine junior officer (e.g., engineering, 
procedural, technical skills) and the skills needed to succeed as an artfully competent CO.  How 
a submarine officer transitions from the current junior officer training pipeline to become a good 
tactical decision maker as a CO is lost in the picture, and can not be addressed by new 
technology alone.  Waiting until Prospective Executive Officer (PXO) or Prospective 
Commanding Officer (PCO) training to educate and train the submarine tactical warfighter is not 
sufficient because these skills need a solid, lengthy base to draw from.  Wulfeck and Wetzel-
Smith (in press) outline the optimal training strategies that accommodate the characteristics of 
complex tasks, such as abstraction, variation, interactivity, dynamism, non-linearity, and 
conditionality, among others.  In short, decision making abilities need to be emphasized as much 
as technical skills given the confluence of factors of incredibly complicated tasks.   
 
Even if a person has the right synthesis of abilities, the organizational system in which he 
performs may promote or inhibit their application.  These are skill sets that need to be developed 
from the beginning of an officer’s career, in their chosen specialty – not waiting until the time in 
which they may needed.  If their professional development is provided in a more holistic manner 
then there will be little need to “train” them for decision making in their senior positions.  In 
other words, decision making can not be optimal if the right skills and abilities are not engrained 
from the start of their professional career.   
 
Type of Experience 
 
In addition to training, development of the confluence of these skills also requires the right 
operational experience.   As with training, experience alone will not produce an artfully 
competent officer – it is the type of experience.  To build up creative, affective, analytical, and 
intuitive skills an officer needs the opportunity to be able to perform his skills in as many 
different types of situations as possible.  The breadth and depth of operational experience will 
have the greatest influence (e.g., mission areas, operational areas).  
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What type of training and experience is needed?  First, training that requires the application of 
these abilities is certainly important.  Does the Navy’s current training require the use of creative 
and intuitive abilities to succeed?  Do practice scenarios encourage a novel response to a new 
situation, or cognitive flexibility?  If not, then these skills will be less likely to develop, and the 
synthesis of these skills will not be put to the test.  Training by itself is not adequate; it must 
involve deliberate practice (Ericsson et al., 2007).  Moreover, training needs to 1) teach 
principles underlying abstraction, 2) help learners cope with multiple sources of variability in the 
environment, 3) provide aids that reduce memory load, 4) provide strategies for dealing with 
uncertainty and ambiguity, and 5) provide training in problem solving, judgment, and decision 
making (Wulfeck & Wetzel-Smith, in press).  In contrast, training communities tend to focus on 
the end result of performance, such as the accuracy of a solution.  This ignores the cognitive 
processes or skills that are required to get to that solution.  A more effective, comprehensive 
approach would include training on the development and application of these skills utilizing 
deliberate practice and reflection.  The use of scenario-based training that is varied enough to 
require the instantiation of all these skills in different configurations is another key component 
(Ross, Lussier, & Klein, 2005).  
 
This is a cursory look at how the Navy’s training and assessment processes are aligned with the 
skills proposed to support a CO’s superior performance supporting decision superiority.  A 
person can develop artful competence and the prerequisite skills only to the extent that the 
environment allows him.  A warfighter may have all the internal attributes, but in the absence of 
a supportive environment these abilities will remain undeveloped, and will not appear when they 




Military operations require agile decision making due to the incredible complexity of the mission 
environment.  The mischaracterization of SA as an instantiation of a technological system via the 
COP translates to an overemphasis on technological solutions to decision superiority and 
performance issues.  Preparing people for decision making in this environment requires 
realigning professional training and selection, and development of training for prerequisite 
analytical, intuitive, creative, and affective skills.  A decision maker’s skill of striking a balance 
among these abilities, finding the right synthesis for the right situation, adapting to the situation, 
and moving along the continuum of performance, is what is needed to improve decision making 
in the maritime environment – not more C2 displays.  With a renewed focus on the decision 
maker side of the equation, coupled with the current effort on C2 technological systems, the 
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